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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Status of Civil Service in Ohio
Public office as a public trust, though a concept seemingly
minimal to acceptable representative government, is not one of long
acceptance. The history of English governmental administration re-
veals in the not too distant past a view of public office as essentially
the property of the officeholder, a view so entrenched as to leave its
traces in the American law of public officers.' If this low estimate of
governmental service did not gain an equally strong hold in this coun-
try, the Jacksonian spirit spawned a more subtle, but no less vicious,
attitude. No longer was the office the property of its incumbent; now
it became the major spoils which of right belonged to the collective
victor at the polls. Against this good old American tradition, decade
after decade saw a losing battle waged by intelligent statecraft's plea
for a governmental service based solely upon merit. That reckless age
when America literally threw away its providence was not concerned
alone with natural resources; it played fast and loose with manpower
as well. With the coming of a measure of community sanity, how-
ever, the merit system in civil service administration took its place
among the great reforms. If for no more lofty reason, a nation of
taxpayers could no longer afford to entrust billion-dollar government
to the sinecurists and party faithful. Paced by the Federal Civil
Service Act of i883,- the administration of the expanding American
governments has largely risen in the dignity of career staffing. It has
been recently observed that in New York less than one percent of
public servants do not enjoy civil service merit rating;3 while exten-
sion of the principle in the Federal Government continues with gov-
ernment attorney positions now "covered in" by Executive order.
4
I Compare State ex rcl. v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98, 5 N. E. 228 (1836), with Dullam
v. Willon, 53 Mich. 322, 19 N. W. 17 (1884), as to power of removal over government
xorlers. The difference in judicial attitude lies, significantly, in one's acceptance and the
other's rejection of the idea of a property interest in a public office.
222 Stat. 403 (1883).
Kaplan, The Merit SysteM and the Constituti n (1940) 27 NAT. MuN. Rav. 83.
4H. Doe. No. 118, Report of President's Comnmittee on Civil Service Imnprovement,
77th Cong., lst Sess. (1941) 22.
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The first wave of civil service reform reached Ohio in I9IO, with
the enactment of legislation requiring installation of the merit system
in municipal administration. But although large discretionary power
with respect to the practicability of manning specific-type positions on
the competitive basis was lodged in local civil service commissions,
large areas were exempted from commission control to remain the
spoils of party plunder. Two years later the subject was one of those
caught up in the great constitutional reform movement that so sig-
nificantly altered Ohio's constitutional framework. After little dis-
cussion and minor rephrasing, Art. XV, §IO went to the sovereign
people for their solemn judgment. As adopted, the provision reads:
"Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the state,
the several counties, and cities, shall be made according to merit and
fitness, to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by competitive exami-
nations. Laws shall be passed providing for the enforcement of this
provision."
Taking prompt action, the 1913 legislature enacted the first state-
wide civil service law.0 Appearances, however, belied the true situa-
tion. Although superior to the preconstitutional version in applying
to all governmental units in Ohio, the new law continued the serious
loophole exemptions. Amendments to the act in 1915,7 while improv-
ing some of the administrative sections, served to make matters worse
as to the coverage of the competitive examinations. Indeed, the 1915
changes produced a statute less effective than that of 191o in terms
of the types of positions included in the classified service, a retrogres-
sion strikingly paralleled by the Illinois experience during the same
general period.8 Since 1915 the Ohio law has remained substantially
the same in the vital respect of its coverage.
Such a lapse of twenty-five years without effective improvement
in state and local personnel provisions-years of such dynamic change
in accepted conceptions of the r6le of Government-makes all the
more grotesque the law that masquerades as Ohio's acceptance of an
5OHio GEss. CODE (1910) §§4477-4505.
103 Ohio Laws 698 (1913).
'106 Ohio Laws 400 (1915).
8 Il1. Legis. Reference Bur., Conast. Convention Bull. No. 9 (1919) 626-628. Ohio's
constitutional provision of 1912 was in a sense matched by People ex rel. v. McCullough,
254 Ill. 9, 98 N. E. 156 (1912), holding an extended civil service system of 1911 valid
even as to constitutional officers. The backsliding movement began in 1913. The period
just before 1912 seems to have been one of considerable advance in civil service develop-
ment. See Kettleborough, Civil Service (1912) 6 Ami. PoL. Sci. Rev. 235. For an inter-
esting thesis as to why such periods have occurred in the history of American civil service
see Ford, Political Evolution and Civil Service Reform (1900) 15 ANNALS 145.
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intelligent approach to the practical matter of adequately staffing some
of the biggest socio-economic enterprises of our time. Nothing in the
constitutional declaration suggests that the forces of evil intent should
carry the day with disemboweling exemptions; the language that car-
ries the stamp of final sovereignty expressly declares that the sole
basis for placing a position in the unclassified service shall be the
impracticability in the circumstances of a competitive examination.
The legislative wording echoes back the expressed intent that the
classified service shall be the rule, the unclassified the exception.
Yet the statute sets out twelve groups in the unclassified service.'
An elected state officer may appoint three secretaries and one personal
stenographer without regard to merit. No officer or employee of the
general assembly need take an examination to determine his fitness
for the position. Likewise no teacher, instructor, or professor in the
public school system or in any public institution, or any member of
the staff of any library supported wholly or in part by public funds,
or most any employee of a court of record, need take any examination
as a condition to appointment. One cannot but ask what is imprac-
ticable about holding competitive examinations for employees of the
general assembly other than the fact of political inadvisability. Wis-
consin has required such persons to prove their ability before they
can be appointed.10 If library management is the science and art it is
now taken to be, it is not easy to understand why applicants for
library positions are not compelled to submit to an examination to
determine their fitness. The same question arises regarding many
other groups placed in the unclassified category.
Responsibility for the continuation of this regrettable situation
lies with Ohio's courts as well as with its legislature. True, the early
decision of the Supreme Court in State, ex rel. Brysom, v. Smith,1'
carried dicta to the effect that the general assembly and the state
judiciary faced no more imperative a duty than that of providing for
compliance With the letter and spirit of Art. XV, §io. But as the
9 The groups include elected officers, election officials and clerks, members of boards
and commissions, all members and employees of the general assembly, all men in the
military service of the state, all employees in public educational institutions employed in
educational work, the staff of any library supported in whole or in part by public funds,
feveral assistants or clerks for each elected official, the deputies of the elected officials
authorized to act for their principals, certain employees in courts of record and assistants
to the Attorney General, law directors, prosecutors, etc.
" WIS. STATS. (1937) . 16.09; Report On the Joint Legislative Committee on Adminis-
trative Reorganication of the Ohio General Assensbly (1921) 64.
11 101 Ohio St. 203, 128 N. E. 261 (1920).
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course of litigation pricked out meaning for that supposed mandate,
it became increasingly clear that judicial laxity would be the hallmark
of its interpretation. The cornerstone of Ohio Court attitude was laid
in Ellis v. Urner, decided in 1932.12 There the court in holding that
the legislature was justified in placing deputy clerks and deputy
bailiffs in the unclassified service gave the civil service movement in
Ohio a double setback. Mincing no words, the court declared Article
XV, §io not to be self-executing; this consequence was drawn from
the declaration of the last line in the provision that "Laws shall be
passed for the enforcement of this section." Moreover, not content to
stop there, the court went on to deal a second blow in these words:
"The legislature having seen fit to provide . . .that these of-
ficials shall be in the unclassified service, such action on the part of
the legislature is within its constitutional power and is a valid enact-
ment... If the legislature has passed an unwise provision ... the re-
sponsibility rests on the legislature and not upon the courts." 13
At the very least such language ominously indicated judicial in-
tent to accord every latitude to the legislative judgment on the prac-
ticability of ascertaining "merit and fitness . ..by competitive ex-
amination." This attitude, foreshadowed by the Bryson case, appears
again, shortly after the Ellis decision, in State ex rel. Day v. En-
"tons. 4 There the positions of assistant cashier and supervisor of
cigarette tax stamps, both in the office of treasurer of state, just as
the position of cashier in the Secretary of State's office, litigated -by
Bryson and Smith, were deemed to require "strict integrity and high
moral character." This made it "not easy" for the court "to under-
stand how merit and fitness of the occupant of this position can be
determined by competitive examination [but] by close and intimate
knowledge of the applicant and opportunity for observation of him."'"
In both cases-the positions involved required the handling of large
sums of state monies. But although there stressed by Ohio's high
court, the teaching of Ellis v. Urner itself is seemingly that any close
association between deputy and principle creates a confidential if not
a fiduciary relationship which is incapable of ascertainment by com-
petitive examination. The Supreme Court held, very soon there-
after, that "The position of assistant director of law is necessarily a
12 125 Ohio St. 246, 181 N. E. 22 (1932).
13Id. at 250, 181 N. E. at 23.
14 126 Ohio St. 19, 183 N. E. 784 (1932).
1" State ex rel. Bryson v. Smith, supra note 11, at 208, 183 N. E. at 785.
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position of trust and confidence."' If to measure qualifications for
such an office by examination would be "approaching assininity."
as the court asserted, where lies the assininity when a common pleas
court accepts a legislative exemption from the classified service of the
personal stenographer and the private secretary of the Cleveland
municipal court ?7
The attitude revealed in this recent lower court judgment hints
at judicial acceptance of an interpretation of the Ellis v. Urner
language even more emasculative of the apparent intent of the Ohio
constitution makers of 1912. An impression, though not an affirma-
tion, is left that the legislative judgment on the issue of practicability
is final, that, in other words, Art. XV, §io is not judicially enforce-
able but directory only. It is clear that the Supreme Court did not
start out with any such conception; State ex rel. v. Smith 's asserted
that the question of impracticability was "necessarily a judicial one."
Yet the language of the influential Urner case is capable of the con-
trary import, and recent Supreme Court utterances continue the
equivocation. Thus May of 194o found the court twice affirming the
authority of the General Assembly to relieve offices from civil service
conditions, once in the case of health district employees " and again as
to a county visitor attached to a juvenile court.2 0 In neither instance
was there independent consideration of the issue of practicability; on
the contrary, finality of the legislative action appears to be accepted,
although in the former opinion the court did find "no abuse of legis-
lative authority." Ironically enough, the only instance of a Supreme
Court declaration of legislative action beyond constitutional bounds
is the recent De Woody 21 decision wherein the Akron City Charter
had sought to place in the classified service the type of office which
the court had, in the Kerr case,2 2 held to be incapable of practicable
staffing by competitive examination. After thirty years of constitu-
tional provision, then, Ohio's civil service program can reap only the
opposite of what was sowed!
Clearly, those seeds of promised reform fell on the rocky soil
11 State ex rel Ryan v. Kerr, 126 Ohio St. 26, 183 N. E. 535 (1932).
17 State cx rel. Henry v. Civil Service Comm., 19 Ohio Ops. 545 (Cuyahoga County
Com. Pleas 1941).
Is Supra, note 11.
' IIMawrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N. E. (2d) 773 (1940).
-- Hasins v. Tyroler, 137 Ohio St. 24, 27 N. E. (2d) 931 (1940).
1 DeWoody v. Underwood, 136 Ohio St. 575, 27 N. E. (2d) 240 (1940).
"3State ex rel. Ryan v. Kerr, sispra ote 16.
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of both legislative hostility and judicial unfriendliness. It is true
that courts have neither the power nor the machinery to compel af-
firmative acts on the part of the legislative branch of government ;23
in this sense such a constitutional provision as Art. XV, §io must
necessarily be not self-executing. But the arsenal of actions by
which judicial power is brought into play contains a device fitted to
the occasion. The taxpayer's action is, indeed, an Ohio favorite;
entertainment of such suits here could cut off the payment of salaries
of persons not covered in by civil service in the manner and to the
extent called for by the constitution's phrasing. The Ohio legisla-
ture has acted, however, and presumably will continue to carry civil
service legislation on the statute books. More serious, therefore, is
the Ohio Supreme Court's apparent position that in the presence of
legislative action the constitutional provision is judicially enforce-
able only to retard civil service extension. This inversion of what
one would normally expect is doubly tenuous. Interpretation of Art.
XV, §io, as setting an upper limit to "covering in" for civil service
is strikingly similar to the court's earlier fallacy in construing Ohio's
Art. XV, §14, as a people's mandate that incumbent judges other
than of the supreme and common pleas benches should be free to run
for non-judicial office, legislative wishes to the contrary notwith-
standing.21 John Marshall's Marbury v. Madison 2' may be dis-
tinguished precedent for such interpretations, but it is admittedly bad
law."6 As questionable as the holding that Art. XV, §io does set a
constitutional ceiling on legislation favorable to civil service cover-
age, is any inference or assumption that the provision does not fix a
minimum against unfavorable legislative action. The Chairman of
the committee which unanimously proposed the civil service amend-
ment to the Convention declared the purpose of placing such a matter
ii the constitution arose from the fact that "At present the merit
system * * * depends upon mere legislative enactment which can be
repealed at any time. '27 Contemporary comment, though apparently
slight, assumed that ratification had resulted in a mandatory pro-
23 See generally RATTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 68-70.
2 Fulton v. Smith, 99 Ohio St. 230, 124 N. E. 188 (1919).
1 Cr. 137 (U. S. 1803). J
" Of Marshall's declaration that the words of U. S. CONST. Art. III, §2(2) must be
given a negative or exclusive sense . . . or they have no operation at all, CoRWIN, THE
DOCTRINE Or JUDICIAL REviEW (1914) 5-10 says: "But this is simply not so. For though
given only . . . affirmative value, those words still place the cases enumerated by them
beyond the reach of Congress, surely no negligible matter."
272 OHIO CONST. CoNy., PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES (1912) 1373.
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vision,2 - and such clearly was the Supreme Court's first reaction.29
If the quoted language from Ellis v. Urner 30 be taken to intend
judicial liberality in enforcing a constitutional mandate and not as an
embracing of the view of the provision as directory only, the court's
record is little better. For what little debate occurred in the con-
stitutional convention indicates that the exemption for impracticability
was incorporated in recognition of the fact that selection on a merit
and fitness basis would not be satisfactory for "all the heads of
state;" '  such background does not justify the Supreme Court's
repeated assertions or assumptions that the legislative judgment is to
all intents final. This attitude appears to be traceable in large part
to the court's confusion as to the meaning of "competitive examina-
tions"; taking this phase in its narrow unaccepted meaning of wholly
formal examinations on "book learning" has led the court to accord
legislative backsliding every aid and abetment. 2
By the time Ohio's courts were called upon to give life to the con-
stitutional addition of 1912, New York had already experienced con-
siderable judicial interpretation of similarly worded, though not iden-
tical, provision." An early holding that the New York provision
was self-executing"' had been later qualified in Chittenden v.
TVzuster. '  But the judgment in the Chittenden case left solidly en-
trenched the view of a mandatory constitutional safeguard, while
" See Martzloff, Notes oni Curre;zt Legislation (1912) 6 Am. POL. Sci. Rav. 573, 576.
Cf. (1913) 7 Id. 639, 646.
State cx rel. Bryson v. Smith, supra note 11.
ld. at p. 250.
'I Supra note 27.
,'That at the time the court actd civil service examinations were of much broader
nature, see Coker, Progress in Municipal Civil Service: A Review of Recent Reports
(1916) 5 N.T. MuN. Rrv. 574, at 575-579. Note especially this passage, at 575: "The
Lxamination is no longer reccssarily and primarily a written test of memory and accumu-
lated l:nowledge . . . its object is not solely, in many cases not mainly, to discover
whether the applicants possess designated points of information and training; it may
rather be to find out, on the one hand, their actual practical skill, and, on the other,
their basic personal, mental or moral dispositions." See also Koran, Machines its Civil
Scrzice Testing (1942) 2 ED. AND PsYc. MEASUREMENT 167.
"Art. V sec. 6 of the Const. of New York reads as follows: "Appointments and
promotions in the civil service of the state, and of all the civic subdivisions thereof,
including cities and villages, shall ba made according to merit and fitness, to be ascer-
tained, so far as practicable, by examinations, which, so far as practicable, shall be
competitive . . . Laws shall be made for the enforcement of this section."
' I'eople v. Roberts, 149 N. Y. U'60, 42 N. E. 1082 (196). In broad language the
court said: "If the legislature should repeal all the statutes and regulations on the subject
of appointments in civil service, the mandate would remain, and would so far execute
itself as to require the coarts, in a proper case to pronounce appointments made without
compliance with its requirements illegal."
152 N. Y. 345, 46 N. E. 857 (1897).
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other New York decisions have insisted upon a strict interpretation
of the controlling phase "so far as practicable."'36 Friedman v. Fine-
gan may be taken as typical :37
"The will of the people as expressed by section 6 of Art. V of
the state constitution is that there shall be competitive examinations
for all civil service appointments where practicable. Exemption is the
exception, not the rule. The legislature cannot act arbitrarily and
exempt places from competitive examinations at will * * * some good
reason to justify the exemption must appear."
Neither the proceedings of Ohio's 1912 Constitutional Conven-
tion nor other sources make clear what was the origin of Art. XV,
§Io. But its great similarity to New York's Art. V, §6, together
with some extraneous opinion evidence gives basis for the belief
it was taken from the New York constitution."8 It is well established
rule of law that where a state adopts from another state a statute,
which previous to such adoption, has been construed by the courts of
that state, it is presumed to have been adopted with the construction
so given it by that other state.'9  Such a presumption is of course
rebuttable; yet the burden of proving a contrary intent is shifted onto
the person claiming the absence of similarity. This rule has been ex-
tended to the analagous situation where one state adopts the constitu-
tional provision of another state.49 The Indiana Supreme Court ex-
pressed the rule very well in City of Laporte v. Ganewell, etc. Co.:"'
"The clause in our constitution is in legal effect the same as
that of Iowa and was no doubt taken from the constitution of that
state. It is a familiar rule that where a clause is taken from the con-
stitution or statutes of another state it will be deemed to have the
meaning given it by the courts of that state."
'Even though Ohio has elsewhere recognized this rule 4_ it did
31 People v. Lyman, 157 N. Y. 368, 52 N. E. 132 (1898); Palmer v. Board of Educa-
tion, 276 N. Y. 222, 11 N. E. (2d) 887 (1937); Anchesen v. Rice, 277 N. Y. 271, 14 N. E.
(2d) 65 (1938); Matter of Wippler v. Klebes, 284 N. Y. 248, 30 N. E. (2d) 581 (1940).
m268 N. Y. 93, 197 N. E. 755 (1935).
'5 The Merit System and the Higher Courts (1940) 16 GREATER C.EVELAND 45, Cf.
Ordway, The Civil Service Clause in the [New York] Constitution (1914) 5 PRoc. AcAD.
POL. Sci. 251, at 253, who, though not so stating, emphasizes the fact that Ohio was the
first state to "follow New York's example by putting a similar civil service clause . . .
into its constitution."
'5Brown v. State, 17 Ariz. 314, 152 Pac. 578 (1915); Hoffer Bros. v. Smith, 148 Va.
220, 138 S. E. 474 (1927); Denham v. Madale, 194 Wis. 583, 217 N. W. 423 (1938).
4 City of Laporte v. Gamewell, etc. Co., 146 Ind. 466, 45 N. E. 588 (1896); Canfield
v. Bank, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 277, 48 P. (2d) 133 (1935).
4 Supra note 39.
"New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Nadler, 115 Ohio St. 472, 154 N. E. 736 (1926).
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not choose to apply it in this instance, and the decisions of the New
York courts have been given no weight or effect.
Since, then, the legalisms of the situation tip justice's scales in
favor of the case for effective civil service, and since, certainly, the
equities are all on this side of the issue, it is to be regretted that the
Supreme Court of Ohio has failed to play an effective role as "watch-




GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO REGULATE DISTRIBUTION OF
COMMERCIAL HANDBILLS
Plaintiff, refused permission by New York City officials to dock
his submarine for exhibition off Battery Park, obtained a permit to
dock at a state-owned pier. A handbill was prepared containing a
cut of the submarine, a directional map, directions to see featured
points of the sub under competent guide service, and a schedule of
"popular prices." Informed by police that distribution of the hand-
bill would be illegal under Sec. 318 U. Y. C. Sanitary Code,' plaintiff
then printed a second handbill, substantially the same on one side,
except that for the admission price schedule and guide-service refer-
ences there was substituted a statement of the exhibit's uniqueness
and a general description of what the submarine contained. On the
other side, however, it carried a protest against city's refusal to grant
a dock permit, mentioning that the sub could be seen by following
the map on the reverse side. On being notified that street distribu-
tion of this handbill also was prohibited, but that the protest could
be distributed if the "commercial advertising matter on its face were
X L. Y. C. Sanitary Code sec. 318: "No person shall throw, cast or distribute or
cause or permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card, booklet,
placard or other advertising matter whatsoever, in or upon any street or public place, or
in a front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the vestibule or any hall of any
building or in a letter box therein; provided that nothing herein contained shall be deemed
to prohibit or otherwise regulate the delivery of any such matter by the United States
Postal Service, or prohibit the distribution of sample copies of newspapers regularly
'old by the copy or annual subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the
lawvful distribution of anything other than commercial and business advertising matter."
